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Summary:
This paper discusses recent conversation efforts in Northern Pakistan and the relevance of national
parks as legal instruments in nature and wildlife conservation. Employing an extensive case study
approach the paper analyses the problems afficting the Khunjerab National Park and discusses why
the World Conservation Union (lUCN) disregarded its own policy guidelines for mountain
protected areas. The paper advocates a more democratic and pragmatic approach to nature
conservation and argues that national parks as traditionally conceived impose heavy burdens on
local people. Despite increasing criticism of national parks, they continue to be implemented often
for no other reason than the high conservationist profile this alternative offers.
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Introduction1
The involvement of loeal people in planning and management of natural
resouree is now widely reeognized as critieal to eonservation and
development.
Guidelines for Mountain Protected Areas, Duncan Poore (1992: 19)
High up in the Karakoram chain a couple of thousand Wakhi people reside among
some ofPakistan's most spectacular and rugged mountain scenery. They carve out
a living from combining pastoral animal husbandry with some work-migration and
more recently, trekkng tourism. Animals are moved over great distances utilizing
near and distant pastures in a complex pastoral herding system. Women take care
of yaks, sheep and goats on the summer pastures and male herders look after the
animals through the winter. Whereas the resident Wakhi-population has not been
the source of great interest, conservation agencies have been alerted by the
biodiversity importance of this area and its exceptional range of wild animals,
some of them critically endangered. The area is home to the Himalayan brown
bear (Ursos arctos), the world's largest snow-Ieopard (Panthera uncia) population,
wild ungulates such as blue sheep (Pseudo is nayaur), Siberian ibex (Capra ibex
siberica) and is the last refuge for the endangered Marco Polo sheep (Ovis ammon
polii).
ln 1974 the American wildlife biologist, George B. Schaller, proposed
establishing a national park in the area (Schaller 1980: 98ff.). The main objective
of the park was to protect the Marco Polo sheep and, possibly, a remnant
population of the Tibetan wild ass (Equus hemonius kiang). ln order to comply
with the World Conservation Union's (lUCN) guidelines for national parks,2
Schaller deliberately drew the borders so as to exc1ude permanent vilages. That
the proposed park covering about 2.300 sq. km inc1uded all significant pastures of
local Wakhi vilagers Schaller considered to be "details (which) could be resolved
later" (ibid.: 98). The then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto,
enthusiastically embraced Schaller's proposal and on April 29, 1975 the Kunjerab
National Park (KNP) was formally gazetted (Map 1: NOT INCLUDED).
My own involvement with this case is based on two short periods of fieldwork
in Shimshal, the Wakhi vil age which most adamantly rejected the national park
Forthcoming in: Nature Conservation and Human Rights in Asia, edited by Arne Kalland.
NIAS/Curzon Press, 1997.
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National park (IUCN Category Il): "To protect outstanding natural and scenic are as of national
or international significance for scientific, educational, and recreational use. These are relatively
large natural areas materially unaltered by human activity, where commercially extractive uses
are not permitted" (IUCN 1985).
l
plans (Knudsen 1992). Unannounced visits by foreign researchers aroused local
suspicion and were put in connection with the park plans. Prior to my first visit
in 1990, the Norwegian wildlife biologist Per Wegge had done a field survey in
Shimshal (Wegge 1988). Since L was a Norwegian too, by implication, L would
have to be a wildlife specialist. My research topic - herd ownership, range
management and agro-pastoralism - added weight to this interpretation. None of
these topics were neutral. To the contrary, they were the types of information
people in Shimshal jealously guarded and did not want to fall in the hands of
national park "spies", of which many suspected, L was one.
Did the Shimshalis and the other Waki vilagers have reason to be concerned?
It is my c1aim that they did. Though details are lacking and the narrative is
difficult to piece together, the following represents - as far as L am able to
confirm it - the chain of events that hauled the Wakhi vilages in the Khunjerab
from relative obscurity in the 1970s to the centre of controversy in the 1990s. My
argument is that national parks despite imposing heavy burdens on local people,
are implemented primarily for the high conservationist profile this alternative
offers. Ln particular, this paper is critical of lUCN' s preservationist approach to the
Khunjerab National Park which studiously ignored the organization's own
guidelines for mountain protected areas.
The Khunjerab National Park3
Due to the unresolved border dispute between India and Pakistan ("Kashmir
conflct") the Northern Areas (NA) of Pakistan lack provincial status and are under
federal adminstration from lslamabad. The region's lifeline is the Karakoram
Highway (KKH), a 1.300-km artery which begins in lslamabad and ends at the
Khunjerab Pass (4.750 masI) where the KKH crosses into Kashgar in China. The
Khunjerab plateau is an old grazing ground for Wakhi vilagers and in Wakhi
language Khunjerab means "Valley of Blood". Tourists who travel by bus across
the plateau in summer can hardly imagine the hardships of living there, nor are
they likely to see the rust y signboard which inform passers-by that they are
entering the Khunjerab National Park (KNP). Unti the late 1980s, the park which
was intended as a showcase of modern nature conservation, in reality , was little
else than dotted lines on the map. There was only a rudimentary park staff and the
lack of money and absence of a management plan meant that outside a small area
c10se to the KKH, there was almost no supervision of wildlife in the park. While
this had little advers e effect on most of the wildlife, the Marco Polo sheep, the
park' s most threatened species, was under strong pressure and dec1ining at an
alarming rate. Poaching had reduced the number of Marco Polo sheep from an
estimated 300 in 1975, to about 100 in 1980. The last reliable confirmation was
3 Parts of this chapter have been published earlier, see (Knudsen 1995).
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from 1992 when fifty-two Marco Polo sheep were spotted (WWF 1996: 37).4
Both local vilagers, poachers, game wardens, army personnei and Chinese border
patrols were at one point single d out for blame, but no definite proof was ever
produced.
Acknowledging the many shortcomings of the management of the KNP,
especially the protection of the Marco Polo sheep, the government of Pakstan in
collaboration with lUCN set out to forge and implement a new management plan.
ln order to assess the situation for wildlife in the park, lUCN asked Wegge to
carry out a wildlife survey in the park and make suggestions for wildlife
management. He conducted a range of surveys and wildlife counts at different
locations within the park (Wegge 1988) and completed the first real expert wildlife
evaluation since Schaller in 1974. Based on his fieldwork, Wegge argued that
there was no scientific basis for the alleged competition between wildlife and
domestic animals, and hence no need for a strictly defined "category Il" national
park. He also argued that the populations of ibex and blue sheep were large
enough to sustain a commercial hunting program. The Marco Polo sheep, however,
were critically endangered. ln addition to immediate measures in order to save the
Marco Polo sheep, Wegge proposed extending the park's borders and triple its size
from the original 2.300 sq. km to a total of 6.000 sq. km. His most controversial
suggestion, however, was abandoning the national park designation and turn the
park into a Biosphere Reserve or Multipurpose Conservation Area (lUCN category
VILL). This would make room for domestic grazing and allow the implementation
of a commercial trophy hunting program with profits accruing to the Wahki
vilagers.5 ln general, Wegge's proposal was both sensitive and sympathetic to
preserving traditional use rights inside park.
ln the summer of 1989 the newly forme d governmental organization, the
National Council for Conservation of Wildlife (NCCW), convened a workshop in
Gilgit to draft a new management plan for the KNP (Bell 1992). The participants
overlooked Wegge's proposal and instead dec1ared that their mandate was
exc1usively to draft a management plan for the original "category Il" national park.
The delegates that were present at the workshop did not support Wegge's
proposal, probably because this would strain relations with the government as well
as implicitly endorse downgrading the KNP from a national park to a Biosphere
Reserve. This would involve changing the current legislation,6 and delay the
KNP-management proposal (Wegge 1990; 1992b). The Conservator for Wildlife,
Abdul Latif Rao, which represented the wildlife interests strongly opposed a
revision of the KNP' s status:
4 The Mareo Polo sheep's core habitat is set aside as the "Kilik-Mintaka Game Reserve" (650
sq. km) which is contiguous with the Chinese "Taxkorgan Nature Reserve". Marco Polo sheep,
snow leopards and blue sheep are known to travel between the reserves (National Biological
Service 1996).
5 Wegge (1992a: 112) estimated that annual fees from trophy hunting would amount to Rs.
300.000 (US$ 12.500).
6 The Northern Areas Wildlife Preservation Act of 1975.
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The plan should be strietly in aeeordanee with the purpose statement,
objeetives, and reeommendations of the workshop which reeognize the iUeN
definition of a national park. Any attempt to deviate wil frustrate the purpose
(Rao, in Be1l1992: 131).
While a minority among the participants asked the government to settle the
compensation issue before continuing with the park planning (ibid.: 137), the
majority recommended that all grazing should be stopped immediately (ibid.: 22).
Only if this strategy proved unsuccessful should some grazing be allowed in
selected are as until a phase out program could be instituted. As an alternative for
those affected by the KNP it was suggested to promote ecotourism and rural
development schemes. Apart from Wegge, only a minority of the participants had
any previous knowledge of the area other than guided tours and excursions in
preparation for the workshop.
The aftermath of the Gilgit Workshop
Whereas details of what had happened at the Gilgit Workshop were not known to
Wakhi vilagers, they quickly sen sed that the workshop and the new management
plans for the park did not bode well for their own future. The concern over the
new park plans and anger over not being consulted quickly translated into ad hoc
protests (Hus sein 1994). Though the Gilgit Workshop was not intended to draft
a management plan but to prep are "a framework for a management plan" (Bell
1992: 1), there was growing realization that more information was needed in order
to achieve this goal. Seemingly unaware of the force of the local opposition,
research teams were dispatched to Wakhi vilages. ln November 1989 Shimshalis
twice refused to allow a wildlife survey party to conduct a reconnaissance (Ahmad
1991: 14).
The initial KNP park proposal did not utilize zoning but in a 12 sq. km core
habitat for the Marco Polo sheep the ban on hun ting and grazing had been in place
since 1975. Though park guards occasionally patrolled the zone, the grazing ban
was not strictly enforced and "illcit grazing continued in the area, with the silent
consent of some of the park officials" (Ahmad 1991: 13). Despite the fact that
Wakhi vilagers had not been completely denied access to the Khunjerab plateau,
they feared that the new management plans would make further inroads in their
traditional use of the area.
ln 1990 Wakhi vilages fied a petition against the government to protest the
new management plans (Civil Case File 1990). ln this document Wakhi vilagers
claim ownership to the Khunjerab on the basis of customary use rights. At the
same time they refer to an unwritten agreement whereby they agreed to forego
their use of the Khunjerab plateau for an annual compensation of Rs. 5.000 to
each household. Since the government had never kept its promise of compensation,
the Wakhi vilages no longer felt bound by the oral agreement, and implicitly,
would again exercise their right of grazing in the area. ln response to this claim,
the Forest Department (which technically is in charge of the KNP's management)
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c1aim that following the gazettment of the KNP in. 1975, the area is "crown land",
belonging to the state. The state through the Forest Department challenged the
question of ownership and by implication, rejected the claim to monetary
compensation.
Though the park' s management already at this point was in disaray, there was
more problems ahead. On October 15th 1990 the Gilgit District Court announced
its preliminar ruling which asked both paries to keep the status quo. Until a final
agreement on compensation could be found, the court allowed the Wakhi
communities to continue grazing their animals in the Khunjerab, but not in the 12
sq. km zone where domestic animals had been banned since 1975. Already prior
to the preliminary court ruling, in August 1990, some Wakhi herdsmen had
entered the 12 sq. km zone with their animals.
To defuse the heightened tension created by the confrontation with Wakhi
vilagers, a team was forme d in late 1990 to do additional surveys in the affected
vilages and suggest solutions acceptable to all parties. When the team was ready
to start its work, they learned that the Wakhi vilagers had taken the case to court
and that the planning exercise had to be abandoned. Only one of the original team
members, the American John Mock, was able to complete his fieldwork. Mock
surveyed all the affected Wakhi vilages and concluded that the "decision to ban
all human activity...would seem to guarantee the failure of the park" (1990: 3).
The report had been commissioned by WW' s headquarters in Geneva, but neither
WWF nor lUCN took any immediate note of Mock's critical remarks, nor his
suggestions to redress local grievances. On 26th May 1991 the Wakhi herdsmen
in the Khunjerab no-grazing zone were forcibly evicted by the para-military
"Khunjerab Security Force" (KSF). A checkpoint was erected at the border to
prevent animals and herdsmen from drifting in again. The incident caused
spontaneous demonstrations and Wakhi vilagers blocked the traffic on the KKH
and shouted slogans criticising the government (Slavin 1991: 51).
Prompted by the open clash with the KSF in May 1996, Wakhi vilagers drafted
an unsigned "position paper" which details both the injustice inflicted upon them,
as well as their concrete demands for monetary compensation (Table 1). The 5.000
rupees per household laid out in the civil case against the state in 1990, had now
grown to Rs. 182 millon (US$ 7.5 millon), that is about Rs. 38.400 (US$ 1.600,
1991 value) in annual losses to each of the about 300 affected households (Table
1). While this figure may seem inflated and not a realistic estimate of losses
sustained by local vilagers, we should remember that this is not only a
compensation for lost grazing, but also ilegal removal and sale of timber during
the construction of the Karakoram Highway through Hunza. A noteworthy
exception in this position paper is that there is no mention of the right to hunt.
That the ban on hunting (except perhaps for the Marco Polo sheep) had not been
strictly enforced, could be one explanation of why this is not mentioned. The
position paper is, however, explicit about the need for local people to be actively
involved in the park's management.
ln 1991 new initiatives were taken to break the deadlock and the government
asked Ashiq Ahmad, a wildlife specialist, to contact the defiant vilagers. ln June
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the same year Ahmad met with Wakhi vilagers to prepare the ground for an
agreement between the government and the Wakhi vilagers (Ahmad 1991: 15).
Referring to the position paper mentioned above, Ahmad warned that if the
demands for compensation (Table 1) were accepted by the government it would
create a dangerous precedent for similar cases elsewhere. Ahmad advised the
government to either support Wegge's initial plan for a zoning of the KNP which
would remove the strong resentment over the ban on grazing or to allow grazing
throughout the national park, thereby removing the grazing issue altogether (ibid.:
18). Regarding the question of hunting, Ahmad suggested upholding the general
ban on hunting of wildlife throughout the park.
Table 1
Demands for compensation by the farmers of Gojal Tehsil, Hunza
Subdivision (Gilgit District) for governmental interference in the
Khunjerab National Park
General demands ~ denationalization and privatization of the Khunjerab National Park
~ management responsibilty must be handed over to the local people
~ the previous loss sustained by local people must be compensated
Specifc demands · free grazing must be allowed without disturbance from any
government agency
· if free grazing is not allowed, then a royalty of Rs. 10.000 annually
must be paid to each affected household (approx. 306 households in
Gojal/upper Hunza) *
· 15 years of (economic) losses must be properly compensated. The
total loss (from deprived pasture grounds, unjustified woodcutting, and
expropriation of land for afforestation) is estimated at Rs. 18.27 crore
(Rs. 182 milion = US$ 7.5 millonJt
· 50% of the National Park's annual revenues must be provided to the
local people
· business resources created in areas surrounding the National Park
must be provided to the local people
· no body wil be allowed to do any sort of business or construction
work within the National Park, without permission of the local people
· from those (government) institutions which have constructed
buildings, payments must be made to the local people
· any institution which wants to perform construction wil be liable to
pay for the cost of land
* The original text uses the term "individual" but the intent is likely "household".
t All currency conversion uses the 1991 value of Pakistani rupees (ca. Rs. 24 = US$ l).
Source: Reproduced (with some language editing) from Kreutzmann (1995: 225) and the
original source document (Anonymous 1991).
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Table 2
Excerpt of agreement between graziers of Khunjerab and the
Northern Areas Administration, 1992 ("Khunjerab Agreement")
Range management . provided that the number of animals comply with scientific
estimates of carring capacity, traditional concessions of grazing
wil be allowed to continue
Wildlife protection . all hun ting is banned. Enforcement of the ban entrusted with
Khunjerab Vil age Organizations
· 80% of employment opportunities to local communities
· guiding, portering, lodging of visitors provided by local
communities
Employment
Compensation · resting periods when graziers and livestock wil vacate the
Khunjerab pastures, compensation (minimum) Rs. 1.000 per month
· 70% of revenues (minus management charges) from trophy
hunting to local communities
Trophy hunting
Management . constitution of a Management Board (eight seats); the NA's
administration (2), the park administration (1), Inspector General
of Police (1), AKRSP (1), WWF (1) and representatives of
graziers in Khunjerab (1) and Shimshal (1)
Conditions · the NAs adminstration wil suspend the agreement (in part or
whole) in case of violation of grazing and wildlife prescriptions
· a maximum of 100 yaks wil be allowed in the "core zone"
Source: Khunjerab Agreement (1992).
The suggestions made in Ahmad' s consultancy report were used as a basis for
drawing up an agreement with Wakhi vilagers in Januar 1992 (Table 2). Ahmad
- who in the meantime had become Director of Conservation for WWF-Pakistan
- was able to negotiate a deal between the seven Wakhi vilages along the KKH7
and representatives of the Northern Areas Administration. Despite the huge
discrepancy between the original demands for compensation set forth in the 1991
dec1aration (Table 1), all but one of the affected communities signed the
agreement. The community which did not sign was ShimshaL. Though the specific
reasons why the Shimshalis did not sign are unknown, there is reason to believe
that they were sceptical of the agreement on the ground that it bans hunting, which
would hinder their subsistence hunting of blue sheep and ibex and outlaw their
current practice of selective cullng of wild predators (in particular wolves).
Despite the fact that the agreement relaxes the "no-grazing" clause and "traditional
concessions of grazing" wil under certain conditions be allowed to continue
7 Ghalapan, Morkhun, Jamalabad, Gircha, Sarthees, Nazimabad and Sust.
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(Table 2), Shimshalis remained sceptical of allowing any interference with their
customary herd management, and feared that this was only a first step towards
phasing out grazing inside the KNP altogether. U nlike the Wakhi vilages along
the KKH, the Shimshalis had neither used the Khunjerab plateau, nor traded their
customary grazing rights for monetary compensation. For them, compensation had
never been an issue. It is, however, all the more surprising that the other Wakhk
vilages did sign, since the agreement does not refer to the compensation issue.
One reason why the other Wakhi vilagers signed could be the implied use of
force. It is known that in order to make Shimshal line up with the other Wakhi
vilages, the government in 1991 dispatched the District Commssioner to the
vilage. Arriving by helicopter, he threatened to imprison the chief spokesman of
the Shimshal vilagers, the vilage teacher Daulat Amin. Only through an eloquent
defence, highlighting the predicament of the vilage, the importance of their
pastoral economy and the vilagers' history of loyalty to Pakstan, was the
commssioner talked out of takng action against Amin. 
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Collaborative management of the KNP
It is a common pattern that "community-based tenurial rights are not recognized
by nation states" (Lynch and Alcorn 1994: 376). A common suggestion for
resolving this problem is "co-management" (Berkes 1991) or "collaborative
management" (Borrini-Feyerabend 1996) and is currently explored as a
management tool in some national parks (Rao and Geisler 1991). While the
formation of a Management Board (Table 2) might be taken as a sign that the
KNP is to be co-managed by the state and local vilagers, there is in reality
nothing in this agreement which signals this intent on the part of the government.
To the contrary, it makes the graziers forego their right to hunt, accept restrictions
on grazing as well as sudden closures when that is deemed necessar. Though the
agreement does specify the size of local recruitment to the park's management,
there is no information of what their status might become and whether they would
exercise any influence on the KNP's management. Moreover, while both the
Khunjerab vilages and Shimshal were promised seats in the proposed
Management Board, the board would be chaired by the Administrator of the
Northern Areas, the highest authority of the region. The agreement therefore
suggests a definite power imbalance in favour of the government.
Shimshal is the only major vilage in Hunza without a link-road to the
Karakoram Highway (KKH). Travel to the vilage entails an exhausting two-days
hike through steep limestone gorges and across shifting scree slopes, rivers and
glaciers. Lacking a road, the vil age has been left outside the many development
changes seen elsewhere in Hunza; there is neither electricity nor mechanized
agricultural equipment in the vilage. Vilagers have since 1989 campaigned for
a new road in order to end their isolation. After some years stand-still, road
8 D. Butz, Brock University, pers.comm., February 1996.
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construction has been resumed and the government has contracted the work to
local entrepreneurs. Shimshalis long for an end to their isolation, but there is
apprehension that construction of the road wil give the local adminstration an
alibi for greater intervention in community affairs and might therefore be used to
put pressure on the community to agree to the KNP-plans.9 For Shimshal, the
KNP-plans are therefore especially threatening and as one vilager explained it: "lf
they make it a national park, Shimshal wil be a tomb" (Knudsen 1992).
No other community in Hunza eng age in pastoral animal husbandry to such a
degree as Shimshal, neither do they move so many animals over such large
distances. lnstead of acknowledging the significance of this community,
enforcement of the park plans would put an end to their pastoral animal
husbandry. The plan to sedentarize the Shimshalis overlook the cultural
significance of their mountain pastures (pameer) and the bi-annual migration
(kooch) to and from the pastures which are high points in Shimshalis' pastoral
cyc1e (Knudsen 1992: 46). The original park plans would fragment this local
management system and upset pastoral migrations which were fully compatible
with the aims of conservation. Already in 1979, lUCN's guidelines for
conservation in mountain environments pointed out that:
Especially in arid and semi-arid regions, nomadic grazing and transhumanee of ten
make the best sustained use of grazing lands; these traditional practices should not
be changed without very good reason (Dasmann and Poore 1979: 27, italics added).
Shimhalis' herd management system would seem to be an archetypal example of
a "traditional practice" and, as confirmed by range surveys, over-grazing was
hardly evident (Wegge 1988). While Brandon and Wells (1992: 565) are correct
that "there has been a tendency to 'glamorize'... .indigenous resource management
practices" it is dangerous to write them off before their potential role has been
established. Moreover, while it is commonly assumed that domestic animals
disturb, displace or compete with wildlife, domestic animals in the KNP wil help
sustain a larger carnivore population and relieve some of the predator pressure on
wild ungulates (Ahmad 1991: 10).10
Though the 1992 agreement was to mark the dawn of a new partnership
between Wakhi vilagers and the government this did not happen, probably
because both sides remained unconvinced of the others' intentions. ln 1992 the
proceedings from the Gilgit Workshop (Bell 1992) was published, sponsored by
the US National Park Service, the Government of Pakistan and lUCN. lnterviews
with Wakhi vilagers are summarized on less than a single page and demonstrate
how litte time and effort were spent consulting with the affected communities.
However, there has since been increasing recognition that the KNP issue cannot
9
D. Butz, pers.comm., February 1996.
10 Researchers disagree over this point. Some argue that the size of wildlife populations have been
exaggerated and that domestic animals do compete wIth wild ungulates (WWF 1996: 114, 119).
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be resolved unless the government adopts a more reconciliatory stance vis-à-vis
local communities. ln September 1994 the WWF-Pakistan representative Chaudry
lnayatullah lectured on the KNP-case,11 and admitted to many of the problems
in the park. Re explained that in the period 1991-94 there had not been much
progress in the planning process. lnayatullah stressed that the rules governing
grazing in the park were too strict and should be relaxed. He was also critical of
the current stationing of the Khunjerab Security Force (KSF) on the KNP border
which increased local mistrust and opposition to the park. To improve relations
with local people he suggested an immediate removal of KSF personnei and
involving vilage organizations in park management. lnstead of adopting
lnayatullah's sound policy advice, the WWF did not officially soften its stance on
the KNP-issue and the WWF-sponsored booklet An Ecotourists Guide to the
Khunjerab National Park (1995) neither refers to the disputed nature of the park
nor the c1aims of Wakhi vilagers.
The new KNP management plan
The revised management plan for the KNP was presented during an inauguration
ceremony in Gilgit in November 1996 (WWF 1996). The plan is to be
commended for trying to disentangle the complex issues at stake, but stil falls
short of providing new answers to how they can be resolved (Table 3). The total
operating costs for activities planned under the five-year management plan
amounts to a staggering Rs. 57 milion (ca. US$ 1.5 million) (WW 1996: xvi)
and underlines the problem of sustainability as "protected areas wil not generate
enough revenues to cover their costs" (Dixon and Sherman 1991: 69). Though
park fees to be paid by visitors are sometimes a vital source of income, studies
from the Northern Areas show that both the number of visitors and the abilty to
collect park fees are very low. Cross-checking different sources, Mock and Q'Neil
found that about 20-25.000 tourists per year visited the Northern Areas and Chitral
(1996: 10) but only a minority ofthese were trekkng tourists. Revenues from park
fees are negligible and in 1992 amounted to only Rs. 56.600 (US$ 1.500)
(Development Research Group 1995).12 To cover costs for compensating those
giving up grazing as well as loss of domestic animals to predators, the plan
suggests levying an entry
11 Presented at the Skardu Workshop, 28-29 September, 1994.
12 In comparison, peak fees paid by c1imbing expeditions in 1992 totalled Rs. 3.7 milion (US$
152.700) (Development Research Group 1995: 58).
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Table 3
Excerpts from the new KNP management plan, 1996
Employment · 80 % local employment in park (contingent on giving up grazing
concessions)
Income-generation · levy entry fee on vehic1es (to cover loss of grazing concessions
and domestic animals killed by predators )
· promote ecotourism
Boundaries . park borders extended to comply with Wegge's original proposal
· no land-use zonation
Wildlife protection · Shimshal to remain in KNP and rules of wildlife protection to
remain in full
· enforcement of hunting ban entrusted with vilage organizations in
Khunjerab and Shimshal
· carying weapons banned throughout the park (does not apply to
KSF)
Management
Park authority
· Management Committee (distribution of seats not specified)
. KSF and KN-administration
Source: WWF (1996)
fee on all vehicles crossing the Khunjerab plateau (WWF 1996: 64). This is a
potentially promising source of income, but depends on factors such as the number
of vehic1es, the wilingness-to-pay and a transparent and accountable system for
dividing funds between park bodies and local communities.
ln accordance with Wegge's earlier suggestion the new management plan
suggests enlarging the KNP to a total of 6.150 sq. km but does not, as suggested
by Wegge, include land-use zoning as a management tool (Table 3). The reason
given for not dividing the park into land-use zones (core-, protected- and hunting
zones) is that not enough is known about wildlife habitats and would require
c10sure of areas now used for domestic grazing (WWF 1996: 38). Since hunting
zones have not been identified, this also meant that plans for implementing a
commercial trophy hunting programme as planned under the "Khunjerab
Agreement" also were put on hold (Table 2). lnstead, the plan suggests immediate
measures to protect wild ungulates (in particular Marco Polo sheep and Tibetan
wild ass) and large predators. The plan promotes ecotourism as a new source of
income, but neither mentions the compensation issue nor easing the ban on
hunting. It also upholds the general hunting ban throughout the park and despite
ve sting enforcement of the ban with vilage organizations, this is unacceptable to
Shimshalis who see cullng of predators as essential to the viability of their
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pastoral animal husbandry.13 While the new park plan promises 80 per cent of
KNP job opportunities to local communities (WWF 1996: 47), this offer is made
contingent upon surrendering grazing concessions and therefore not applicable to
ShimshaL. What remains is the possibility of promoting ecotourism, of which
Shimshal already is the prime beneficiar (Knudsen 1992: 69ff.).
ln some respects the new management plan is "too little too late" and elements
of the plan have already been pre-empted by grassroots initiatives of Wakhi
vilagers. Aided by funding from senior Pakistan People's Party politicians - most
prominently President Farooq Leghari - the "Khunjerab Vilagers Organization"
(KVO) consisting of the vilages along the KKH has initiated its own conservation
programme in a 30 km buffer-zone outside the KNP' s border (Khan 1996).
Similarly, Shimshal vilagers have formed their own "Shimshal Nature
Preservation Trust" which aims to protect the environment and preserve
biodiversity.14 Neither of these initiatives have been welcomed by the authorities
and there is local resentment that "the big environment NGOs which were on the
scene when..(we)..were against conservation have jilted us after we to ok matters
in our own hands" (ibid.: 142). Vilagers believe they should have a say in the
management of the KNP, and suspect that the plans wil enrich the government
at their expense. ln the words of Qurban Mohammed, spokesman for the KVO,
Wakhi vilagers are:
interested in developing the Khunjerab National Park, but the management of the
park should be in local hands. The government wil take the profit without
involving the people. They just want to take all this beautiful land away and leave
us empty-handed (Mohammed in, Slavin 1991: 49).
ln the present c1imate of mutual mistrust between Wakhi vilagers and the
government, collaborative management of the KNP is impossible. ln order to
protest the police checkpoint put up by the para-military Khunjerab Security Force
(KSF) in 1991, the KVO has recently erected its own awami ("people's")
checkpost just north of the one maintained by KSF.15 The stationing of the KSF
in the park increases Wakhi vilagers feeling of being under siege. Though the
KSF' s principal mission is to guard national security interests at the Chinese
border, it is also the de facto authority of the KNP. While park regulations ban
carrying weapons inside the KNP, this does not apply to the KSF.16 Being both
better organized and armed enables the KSF to "exercise more controlover park
13 Some have speculated that Shimshalis hunt large predators to extinction in order to erode the
foundation of the park (WW 1996: 116). No evidence has been produced to confirm this
charge.
14 J. Mock, pers.comm., April 1997.
15 H. Kreutzmann, University of Bonn, pers.comm., September 1996.
16 The KSF has been accused of hunting "the endangered species (in the KN) with the very
weapons with which they are supposed to protect them" (Development Research Group 1995:
81).
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resources than KNP staff ... Consequently, park rules and administration are
relegated to a secondary position" (WWF 1996: 44-45). Though the plan suggests
ve sting formal park authority with the KNP-administration, there is in reality no
short-term administrative solution to the problem.
Changing perceptions of national parks
There is growing realization that national parks, as traditionally conceived, are il-
fitted to the reality in developing countries (Ghimire and Pimbert 1997; King and
Stewart 1996: 297). This, in particular, concerns the question of residence in
national parks. Here, the views are sharply divided, varying from those who
advocate peoples' rights, to those who are critical of allowing blanket residence
in national parks. The latter "conservationist approach" is linked to what is termed
the "Yellowstone mode!" which emphasized that national parks should preserve
the pristine beauty of the wilderness, hence, resident people were perceived as an
obstacle to the aims of conservation (Kemf 1993: 6). Despite recent attempts to
reconcile the needs of conservation with basic human rights through more selective
approaches (Dearden et aL. 1996), the denial of customar use rights of native
populations remains the single most problematic issue in national parks in the
developing world (Co1chester 1994). A survey of national parks found that almost
"two-thirds of the parks reported ilegal removal of wildlife, and half reported
removal of vegetation, poor relations with local people, and conflicting demands
for park resources" (McNeely 1990: 18).
Criticism of national parks has been made on more pragmatic grounds, arguing
that most are too small to have tangible effects on conservation or foster an insular
mentality where the park itself is carefully managed, while surrounding are as are
left open for exploitation (McNeely 1990: 20). The critique of national parks has
also focused on social injustice (Orlove and Brush 1996: 333) and the costs
inflcted on resident populations. While the direct costs of establishing and running
a national park is borne by the state (or foreign donors ) the indirect costs from,
for example, increased predator pressure are borne by the local communities.
Another cost to local people is the opportunity costs, that is the costs incurred
through lack of access to grazing, hunting, forest products etc. as a result of the
park (Wells 1992). ln general, the direct costs are rather small since governments
typically allocate only the bare minimum of funds for running parks. The main
costs are therefore those which are inflcted on local people through the creation
of the parks. This problem is especially acute in those cases where establishing
national parks results in eviction or displacement of the original inhabitants (cf.
Rao and Geisler 1991). An alternative to national parks are participatory
approaches such as "lntegrated Conservation-Development Projects" (lCDPs)
(Brandon and Wells 1992). lCDPs' seek to promote conservation by providing
alternative income for the inhabitants but are not, as sometimes claimed, a
development panacea (WelIs 1992: 240). A central feature of lCDPs is land-use
zoning and the creation of buffer zones. While land-use zoning was previously
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seen as a way to accommodate the need of different user-groups with wildlife
protection, recent studies are less optimistic of the zoning principle in order to
achieve multiple-use in national parks (Co1chester 1994: 31). EspecialIy, "it may
be difficult to convince local people that restricted buffer-zone access is a valuable
benefit if (a) they had unrestricted use of the area before establishment of the
protected area; or (b) many of the resources of the proposed buffer-zone area had
already been degraded or depleted - both common situations on park boundaries"
(Wells 1992: 240).
ln order for people to value conservation they must be secured income from
resources which have supported them in the past and be allowed to earn
supplemental income. Currently, ecotourism is advocated as the most promising
avenue for creating alternative employment for rural populations. A general
problem with ecotourism is that most of the profits are not realized locally, but
pocketed by national and international tour operators (Brandon and Wells 1992:
36; Co1chester 1994: 33). The amount of money earned locally needs therefore not
be large, and locals are often left with the negative impacts of modern ecotourism
which, despite its appealing name, of ten is anything but "ecological". A major
problem in the high mountains of Northern Pakistan is the firewood requirements
of foreign expeditions and trekkng tourists which put heavy pressure on the sparse
forest cover. Another problem is campsite-specific impacts such as garbage dumps
and human waste (Rashid 1994).
McNeely (1988; 1989) has pointed out the need for nature conservation to
become more profitable (as well as how the loss of biodiversity should be better
accounted for). This "pragmatic" approach to nature conservation has lead to the
foundation of community-based trophy hunting programmes with economic
benefits going to local communites. Despite increasing criticism of such
programmes in East and South Africa (Gibson and Marks 1995), trophy hunting
has been promoted as the only viable strategy for wildlife management in Pakistan
because "a complete ban on hunting, which in theory sounds fantastic, is severely
counter-productive in reality. It is logistically impossible for the government to
enforce it" (Durrani in, Mallick 1994). This approach has gradually gained
acceptance and both lUCN and WWF now run participatory conservation projects
in the Northern Areas (Nasar 1995; Khan 1996).17
The wilingness of lUCN and WWF to initiate participatory conservation
projects is in stark opposition to the confrontational strategy adopted in the case
of the KNP. A possible reason for the strict preservationist approach to the KNP
was institutional inerti a on the part of lUCN. At the time of the Gilgit Workshop
in 1989 the active use of zoning in national parks was already common and
utilized with good effect in Nepal (Wegge 1992b: 59). Moreover, what we could
call the "research wing" of lUCN under the leadership of McNeely (Chief
Conservator Officer) had already begun advocating more pragmatic conservation
17 The first project phase is scheduled for three years (1996-1998) and funding for the
"Biodiversity Project" comes from UNDP under its Global Environmental Fund (Nasar 1995).
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measures. ln 1988, a year prior to the Gilgit Workshop, McNeely published his
Economics and Biological Diversity (1988). ln this book and subsequent artic1es
McNeely (1989; 1990) developed lUCN's new approach to nature conservation
and wildlife management. Central themes were the active use of economic
incentives (and disincentives) in order to conserve biological resources. ln the
years to come, lUCN placed greater importance on preserving natural and cultural
diversity (McNeely 1992a) and acknowledged that "relationships between people
and land have toa often been ignored or even destroyed by well-intentioned but
in sensitive resource conservation and management initiatives" (McNeely 1992b:
140). Against this background, it is puzzling that lUCN so strongly endorsed the
category Il model for the Khunjerab National Park. During the Gilgit Workshop
in 1989 Dr. John B. Sale (sitting in for Dr. Marin Holdgate, Director General of
lUCN) dec1ared that:
IUCN and similar international conservation organizations stand ready to
assist in the development and implementation of the management program
(in the KNP), assuming that it continues to follow the internationally
recognized norms for a national park. It is clear from this workshop that the
Government of Pakistan has this firm intention. Nothing should be allowed
to deflect from this admirable resolve (Sale in, Bell 1992: 133, italics added).
Despite the changes which had taken place in lUCN's conservation policy, the
organization endorsed the strict category Il national park model and, seemingly,
made this mandatory for continued support of the park planning process.
Moreover, lUCN ignored advice from Wegge, lUCN's own consultant and the
most knowledgeable person on the situation of wildlife in the KNP. The problems
in the KNP has become an embarrassment to the government and to lUCN which
in the years since the Gilgit workshop has distanced itself from the KNP-problem.
The government had hoped that the KNP would become Pakistan's first "World
Heritage Site" , a prestigious list of the world' s outstanding natural and cultural
sites under UNESCO's World Heritage Convention. The unresolved problems in
the KNP made the authorities realize that they would need to look elsewhere to
fulfil this ambition.
The Central Karakoram National Park
While both lndia and Nepal each has one park listed as a World Heritage Site,IS
Pakistan so far has none. Pakstani authorities have been eager to end this regional
imbalance and in 1992 lUCN in collaboration with the government initiated the
groundwork for a new national park in the surroundings of K2, the world' s second
highest mountain (8611 masI). ln the mid-1970s, Schaller had deemed a national
park in the vicinity of K2 as unnecessary and had instead suggested that the
IS Nanda Devi National Park (India) and Sagaratha National Park (Nepal).
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government should pursue what later became the Khunjerab National Park.
However, a pre-preparatory mission in 1992 by lUCN's Senior advisor Jim
Thorsell (1992: 4) concluded that the natural values of the Central Karakoram area
"are clearly exceptional on a world scale" and would meet the criteria of a World
Heritage Site. However, Thorsell pointed out that it was the natural beauty of the
area rather than its abundant wildlife which was the main reason for establishing
a park. The initial park proposal for the "Central Karakoram National Park"
(CKNP) covered about 3.000 sq. km and inc1uded the major mountain massifs,
valley-systems and glaciers of the central Karakoram region (Map 1).19
ln late September L 994 Pakistan authorities were ready to follow up on
Thorsell's recommendations and for that purpose, organized a workshop in Skardu,
the main town in Baltistan. Unlike the Gilgit Workshop in 1989, affected
communities were invited to participate and had also been consulted during field-
visits prior to the workshop. ln addition to the presence of local vilage
representatives from Baltistan, a spokesman for the Khunjerab Vilage
Organization was also invited to the workshop. The token inc1usion of local
vilagers generally, and a representative of the defiant Wakhi vilagers especially,
signalled a new attitude on the par of the government and re-directing lUCN-
Pakistan's conservation strategy for mountain protected areas (Fuller 1994).
The initial park proposal from the Ministry (1994) planned to inc1ude three
vilages (Hushe, Khaplu and Askole ) comprising about 1.200 persons within the
park's boundaries while the remaining 29 vilages comprising about 13.300
persons would be inc1uded in the buffer zone. During the workshop a more
detailed map of the park was prepared, and following the wish of local
representatives from Hushe and Askole, the park's southern border was moved
slightly northwards thereby shifting them into the planned buffer zone. Otherwise,
zoning as a management to ol was neither discussed at the workshop, nor was it
later inc1uded in the formal park proposal from Pakistan authorities.
The representatives from Hushe and Askole where concerned with the
importance of proper consultation and engaging in a dialogue with local
communities (Mallck 1994). They were concerned about proper compensation for
losses of domestic animals to wild predators and respect for existing land-use
patterns. Another concern was the pressure tourism and trekking put on scarce
forest vegetation. The Hushe delegates asked that visitors should not be allowed
to use local firewood but should be issued kerosene instead. ln the Hushe valley
the number of trekkers had doubled during the period 1989-92, to an estimated
16.000 man-days per season (Thorsell 1992: 6). ln addition, firewood was carried
out of Hushe to cater for trekkng parties along the Baltoro glacier. For the people
of Hushe it was also important that the park could help them raise living standards
and improve health conditions, especially reducing the high infant mortality. None
of these issues were tackled during the workshop apart from the intent to preserve
19 However, the largest glacier (Siachen Gl.) was excluded by the Ministry of Defence due to the
continued engagement by Pakistani and Indian forces in the region.
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the forest cover through the establishment of kerosene depots in the vicinity of the
park.
Taken together the KNP, CKNP and the Deosai Plateau (proposed as a national
park) would form a contiguous conservation area - what is known as a "bio-
region" (McNeely 1992b: 141) - covering about 50 per cent of the central
Karakoram ecosystem. Whereas local people were consulted, there were neither
concrete discussions of how the CKNP should be managed, nor was co-
management discussed as a management option. As such the main achievement
of the Skardu Workshop was preparing the ground for a management plan by
enlisting local support for the park by crudely fitting its border to existing
settlement and land-use patterns. Though the park plans involved imposing a
hunting ban throughout the park, the implications for animal husbandry in the park
were not discussed. The workshop was not short of expert advice on the people
and the region but only a minority of them had been asked for advice. The
majority of the lectures and papers which had been prepared neither raised key
management issues, nor how the park would balance conflcting demands between
the revenue accruing from trekkng and climbing expeditions, both locally (through
portering and guiding) and nationally (peak fees as government revenue) and the
interest of conservation. However, in order to gain a better basis for evaluating the
range and potential for trekkng tourism, lUCN later commissioned a study of
ecotourism in the Northern Areas under its Biodiversity Project (Mock and O'Neil
1996).
Pakstan is currently seeking a "World Heritage Site" nomination for the
CKNP. There are a obstacles to this nomination, especially the extensive armed
forces deployment in the area and the dispute over jurisdiction between Pakistan
and lndia (the "Kashmir issue"). Nonetheless, the planning process which was
chosen for the CKNP shows that Pakistani authorities now favour a more
democratic planning process by involving local people at an early stage in the
planning exercise. Though the Skardu Workshop was not perfect, it signalled a
willngness to learn from past mistakes and to acknowledge that local people have
an important role to play in the park planning processes.
Conclusion
An integral part of Pakistan's nature conservation strategy has been the creation
of national parks.20 There has neither been an exhaustive evaluation of this
conservation strategy, nor in-depth studies of the current status of wildlife in
Pakistan's national parks, game reserves and game sanctuaries. However, available
material suggests that national parks in Pakistan neither attract foreign tourists nor
give adequate protection to local wildlife. The failure to protect the critically
20 According to a country report prepared for FAO (Anwar 1996) the government of Pakistan in
collaboration with IUCN plan to increase the number of national parks from the present 14 to
a total of 35 national parks.
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endangered Marco Polo sheep in the KNP is a case in point. National parks also
suffer from unresolved ownership c1aims from affected local populations or feudal
lords (Mock, in press). Conservation efforts have also failed due to inadequate
research, faulty advice and lingering stereotypes, especially the belief that
mountain farmers are purposely destroying their environment. This does not mean
that local people are motivated by an "environmental ethic", it does mean,
however, that they wil protect their environment if they are assured that the they
wil enjoy the future benefits.
The KNP was planned as "a showcase of effective conservation in developing
countries" (Bell 1992: 135) but instead became a depressing failure. ln particular,
the planning exercise was a lesson in how not to gain popular support of a park.
The park became a batte-ground between conservationist objectives and an
unrelenting local opposition. The original park plans violated basic human rights
of the resident Wakhi vilagers, and for Shimshal especially, undermined their
livelihood and threatened their future. The Pakistan authorities have put a lot of
energy into addressing the problems in the KNP, but has still not resolved the
issues which are most troublesome, in particular the restrictions on hunting and
grazing.
It is important to note that Wakhi vilagers - despite their small number and
limited means - have staged a successful grassroots campaign and frustrated all
attempts to have them comply with the strict rules governing the park. We do not
know, however, what these acts of civil disobedience have cost Wakhi
communities in terms of lost income, distress and intern al disruption. The
government of Pakistan implemented the outdated "Yellowstone mode!" despite
the fact that it been replaced by more sensitive conservation measures. Moreover,
lUCN actively encouraged this strategy lon g after it was c1ear that it was doomed
to failure. This criticism equally applies to the government and its implementing
agency, the NCCW, which were adamant that the only management option for the
KNP was the lUCN category Il national park.
While this paper is critical of Pakistan's conservation efforts, it does not negate
the efforts Pakistani authorities have made towards protecting the environment
despite a very tight federal budget. Where conservation efforts have been least
effective is in gaining approval from those who are affected. There has been a
definite arogance vis-à-'vis local people and an unwilingness to involve them in
planning matters (MacDonald 1995). This is not the government's fault alone, but
can be blamed on the parent organizations of WWF and lUCN, whose global
mission for protecting wildlife has failed to address the needs of people who,
mostly against their wil, become involved in wildlife conservation. Moreover,
economic considerations compel Third World governments to follow lUCN' s
preservationist standard for national parks. The strict application of the
"exc1usionary principle" is neither lUCN' sinvention nor a novelty on the South
Asian continent: already in 1910 the Marahajah of Kashmir expelled residents
from his private deer reserve (Tucker 1991: 44).
The planning process for the CKNP shows that the authorities are eager not to
repeat past mistakes. Whereas local vilagers under certain pre-conditions were
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supportive of the park plans, no formal agreements have been signed. Neither has
Pakistani authorities decided how they wil tackle demands for economic
compensation nor how to accommodate existing land-use practices with the goals
of a category Il national park.
The Khunjerab National Park wil not outlast the persistent opposition of an
antagonistic population. The Pakistani authorities therefore must - sooner rather
than later - strike a deal with Wakhi vilagers. The token inclusion of a member
of the Khunjerab Vilagers Organization at the Skardu Workshop is an important
symbolic gesture towards the defiant Waki vilagers. lf the government and its
supporting agencies and NGO'sare able to capitalize on this thaw in their
relationship with Wakhi vilagers, the government may be able to realize its goal
of a bio-region of world-scale importance and with the potential to preserve
Northern Pakistan's natural and cultural heritage.
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